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How MUCH IS ENOUGH? ASSESSING THE IMPACT
OF DOLAN V. CITY OF TIGARD
Property has its duties as well as its rights
1

THOMAS DRUMMOND

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."2 For well over a century,3 the Supreme Court took an
ad hoc, factual approach in defining the extent and scope of the
takings doctrine.' During the 1980s and the early 1990s, however,
the Court began to refine and expand upon their previously vague
exegesis of the takings clause.5 In 1994, the Supreme Court added

1. THOMAS DRUMMOND, THm OxFoRD DICIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 258, (Angela
Portington ed., 4th ed. 1992).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 234 (1897) ("(A] state may not, by any of its agencies, disregard the prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment.").
3. The first takings case reached the Supreme Court in 1833. See Barron v. City of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 243 (1833) (holding that the states were not bound by
the Fifth Amendment). The Supreme Court began laying a foundation for the takings
doctrine in 1887. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 623 (1887) (reading the takings
clause literally and holding that government action in the form of regulation could not
amount to a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment).
4. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (stating that
the Court did not wish to pronounce any "set formula," but preferred instead to "engag[e]
in . . .essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" (citations omitted)).
5. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2886 (1992) (creating a categorical rule for regulations that deny a landowner of all economically viable use
of their property); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 825 (1987) (establishing the "essential nexus" test); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 419-20 (1982) (creating a categorical rule for physical takings); Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 255 (1980) (stating a two factor takings test). These cases will be
discussed in greater detail in part 11.
See also DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
THE CONSTruTMON 174-76 (1993) (analyzing takings cases decided by the Supreme Court
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another set of factors to consider in a takings analysis when it
decided the case of Dolan v. City of Tigard.6
Florence Dolan sought a permit from the city of Tigard, Oregon, to expand her plumbing store. The city refused to grant the
permit unless she agreed to dedicate a certain portion of her property for a drainage system and bikepath.7 Requiring a "rough proportionality" between the interest being asserted and the actual
impact of the landowner's proposed property use,8 the Supreme
Court held that the city's action constituted a taking without just
compensation.9 In addition, the city was required to quantify its
findings in order to support its decision to deny the permit.'0
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist sought to elevate
the position of the takings clause by stating that it should not be
"relegated to the status of a poor relation.""
Some commentators feel that Dolan places severe restrictions
on the government when regulating private property uses because it
shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the government. 2
in the 1980s and asserting that although the Court gave more attention to landowner cases
than in prior decades, landowners still have an unfavorable status before the Court).
6. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
7. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
8. The Court announced a new two prong test. The first prong, established in Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), stated that a permit condition must
(1) substantially advance a legitimate state interest and (2) contain an "essential nexus"
between the land use regulation and the state's land use goals. Id. at 834, 837. The new
second prong, established in Dolan, requires a "rough proportionality" between the legitimate interest the government asserts and the actual impact on the landowner's proposed
property use. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319. See also infra parts II.B.1, ll.B.2 (explaining the
two prong standard of development exaction cases).
9. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319. Many of the cases on which the Supreme Court relied
in developing its new takings test used the term "reasonable relationship." The Supreme
Court rejected this terminology because it sounded too similar to the "rational basis" test
used in Equal Protection claims. Id. The cases on which the Court relied will be discussed infra in part I11.
10. Id. at 2322.
11. Id. at 2320.
12. The New York Times called Dolan a "substantial victory" that "placed new limits
on the ability of governments to require developers to set aside part of their property for
environmental or other public uses." Linda Greenhouse, High Court, in a 5-4 Split, Limits
Public Power on Private Property, N.Y. TuMEs, June 25, 1994, § 1, at 1. The Miami
Herald stated that Dolan "may be the most significant victory for property rights in decades." Aaron Epstein, City's Authority Over Use of Land Getting Key Supreme Court
Test, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 23, 1994, at 1. Pete Williams of the NBC Nightly News commented that "[c]onservatives say this ruling goes beyond just city planning, and invites a
flood of lawsuits against government demands that are made on landowners in the name
of protecting the environment." Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, June 24, 1994).
Justice Stevens stated his in dissent in Dolan that "the Court . . . is indeed extending its
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Governments must now justify decisions affecting particular landowners. Some have also suggested that Dolan will increase litigation as parties challenge the methodologies used by the government
to meet the quantification standard. 3
Although Dolan may place a somewhat larger burden on cities
and agencies, it is not the property rights victory that many suggest. In construing Dolan, courts are likely to defer to the
governments' reasonable efforts to quantify the grounds for their
decisions, such as the decision to employ methodologies commonly
used in other environmental decision-making. Courts may not defer
as greatly to state and local governments as they do to administrative agencies, given the unique characteristics of takings cases. 4
However, governments should be able to meet their new burden."5
This Note will analyze the degree of quantification courts may
now require from governments in takings claims and the likelihood
that the methodologies used by governments will be found inadequate. First, this Note will outline the background leading up to
Dolan and examine the case itself. Second, it will analyze the
cases relied on by the Dolan court to support its rough proportionality test and ascertain if they are helpful in overcoming a
future takings claim. Third, the Note will look at courts' past treatment of methodology challenges in claims brought under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Air Act
(CAA) to show the amount of deference courts have traditionally

welcome mat to a significant new class of litigants" and that "property owners have surely found a new friend today." Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2326 (1994)
(Stevens, J.,dissenting).
Senator Phil Gramm recently introduced legislation to statutorily expand Dolan's
property right protection to regulatory takings claims. See S. 2410, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994) ("[Iun the recent landmark Supreme Court case of Dolan versus City of Tigard,
Chief Justice Rehnquist correctly points out the near evisceration of one of the most
fundamental rights upon which our Nation was founded."). The bill requires compensation
to be paid by the government when its action reduces property value by either more than
25% or $10,000. Id. Governments do not have to pay compensation for property uses that
are public nuisances and that will harm the public. Id.
13. Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, Meeting the "Rough Proportionality" Test
of Dolan, N.Y. LJ., July 22, 1994, at 3, 35.
14. See infra notes 204-29 and accompanying text (evaluating whether courts will give
more or less deference to state and local governments in takings cases than they would to
administrative agencies in environmental regulation).
15. Cf Kass & Gerrard, supra note 13, at 3, 35 (stating that courts have given great
deference to agencies' choices of methodologies in the context of environmental impact
statements, but predicting that a "much more searching inquiry is foreseeable in the context of takings adjudications").
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given to governments' choices and uses of methodology. Finally,
this Note suggests possible ways state and local governments can
comply with the Dolan test. By using common, well-known methodologies often used in NEPA and CAA cases, governments should
be able to meet any additional burden imposed by Dolan.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

Takings Generally: Physical and Regulatory

The Supreme Court has had a difficult time formulating a
consistent approach to the Fifth Amendment takings problem and
has resorted to using ad hoc, factual inquiries to resolve takings
cases.' 6 In interpreting takings cases, scholars have had an equally
difficult time trying to draw some method from the Court's apparent madness.' 7 Most identify two general categories of takings
claims: those that involve physical occupation and those that regulate a landowner's use of land to such an extent that it becomes a

16. Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also
supra text accompanying note 4.
17. Many commentators have developed a consolidated approach to takings analysis.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF ENNFNT DOMAIN 331-33 (1985) (asserting that the Fifth Amendment prohibits all government
activity that expressly redistributes private property rights); John J. Costonis, Presumptive
and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Takings Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465,
512-23 (1983) (creating a four-part test for determining when compensation should be required); John A. Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings,
Regulation, and Public Use, 34 RUTrGERs L. REv. 243, 254-62 (1982) (suggesting a theory that would distinguish protected property rights from unprotected economic freedoms to
determine taking claims); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part Il-Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral
Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 53, 55 (1990) (arguing that government should escape
paying just compensation only when intentionally depriving landowners of economic value,
when punishing wrongful conduct or when reserving the right to alter the economic value); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part
I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1301 (1989)
(accusing the Supreme Court of being more confusing than helpful in their takings opinions); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36, 67 (1964) (asserting that government should pay compensation when it acts in its own enterprise but not
as a sovereign).
Jeremy Paul asserts that the search for a unified takings theory "appeals to our
collective fear that the Court's current ad hoc balancing risks straying so far from 'the
text and history of the Constitution [as to become] the antithesis of the rule of law."'
Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1400
(1991) (alteration in original) (quoting Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of
the Takings Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1631 n.6
(1988)).
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taking. 8 Cases like Dolan, which require an exaction 9 from the
land developer, are neither regulatory nor physical in nature. Courts
and commentators, therefore, disagree about whether the Dolan
standard applies to other types of takings claims.'
1. Physical Occupation
A physical taking occurs when a government entity intrudes
and physically occupies a landowner's property." The Supreme

18. For a comprehensive discussion of the physical and regulatory takings doctrine, see
DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 20-55 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992).
19. An exaction is the "contribution that a developer must make to a community in
exchange for permission to develop." Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, "'Take' My Beach,
Please!": Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional
Analysis of Development Exactions, 69 B.U. L. REV. 823, 848 (1989). Many types of
exactions exist. One type of develolpment exaction is a dedication of land for streets,
sidewalks, utility lines, public parks, or schools. Id. Municipalities also have required
developers to make improvements of nearby streets and highways. Id. at 849. If the de-,
veloper has little land to dedicate, some municipalities require a monetary payment in lieu
of dedication. Id. Similarly, large-scale capital expenditures required because of a proposed
development have caused governments to impose "impact fees." Id. Finally, the newest
form of exaction is called "linkage." It requires that a developer build a specific number
of low-income units or contribute to the city's low-income housing fund in order to receive a permit to build in the downtown area. Id.
20. Several cases have held that Dolan does not apply outside of exaction cases. See,
e.g., International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, No. 91-C-1587, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18989, at *63 (N.D. l. Dec. 30, 1994) (refusing to apply Dolan for the
denial of building permits based on an ordinance to protect landmark buildings); Harris v.
City of Wichita, 862 F. Supp. 287, 294 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding that Dolan was not
applicable because the case at hand was a land use restriction case and did not require
the plaintiffs to deed over a portion of their land); Parking Ass'n of Georgia v. City of
Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 203 n.3 (Ga. 1994) (distinguishing the individualized determination in Dolan from the legislative determination of Atlanta's zoning ordinance), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2268 (1995). But see Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043,
1048-49 (Cal. 1994) (discussing the Dolan standard in an inverse condemnation action,
but dismissing the case on ripeness grounds), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995);
Hanson Bros. Enter. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 365 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (Puglia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the current enhanced protection of private property encompassed in Dolan and Nollan would require compensation in a zoning case)
affd, 889 P.2d 537 (1995); Parking Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 204 (Ga.
1994) (Sears, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority that Dolan does not apply to
city zoning ordinance), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2268 (1995); Peterman v. State, 521
N.W.2d 499, 511 (Mich. 1994) (holding that the Dolan standard was met when the state
built a boat-launch ramp on its own property which eventually eroded away plaintiff's
shoreline); Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479, 483 (N.Y. 1994) (stating
that "there is no basis . . . for concluding that the Supreme Court decided to apply different takings tests, dependent on whether the takings were purely regulatory or physical. . . . mhe Supreme Court specifically referred to non-physical regulatory takings
cases.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1961 (1995).
21. MANDELKER, supra note 18, at 21.
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Court, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,' held
that a physical occupation is a per se taking. In Loretto, a New
York statute entitled television cable companies to install their
cable lines and boxes on apartment buildings without interference
from landlords.' The cable companies were required only to pay
a nominal one dollar fee unless the landowner could demonstrate
special damages attributable to the taking.24 The Court determined

that a takings violation arose when there was a "permanent physical occupation authorized by government ...

without regard to

the public interests that it may serve."' The Court found that every strand of the landowner's bundle of property rights was affected.26 Regardless of the government interest involved, Loretto
stands for the proposition that a physical invasion will always be a
taking.
The Court defined the scope of a physical invasion when it
decided Yee v. City of Escondido.2' In Yee, husband and wife mobile park owners were required by state law to roll back rent
'charges to an earlier level and were forbidden to raise the rent
without city approval.' The park owners argued that this was a
physical invasion under Loretto because the mobile home tenants
were permitted to live on the land indefinitely at very low rent.29
The Supreme Court refused to apply Loretto because the park
owners' land was not physically invaded. "The government effects
a physical taking only where it requires the landowner to submit to
the physical occupation of his land."3' Taken in conjunction,
Loretto and Yee illustrate the scope of one category of per se violations of the takings clause-physical takings.
22. 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 n.10
(1946) (discussing a physical invasion of airspace).
23. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423.
24. Id. at 423-24.
25. Id. at 426.
26. Id. at 435. The Supreme Court has considered a number of cases where one of the
"strands" in the bundle of property rights was argued to have been destroyed. See
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (limiting the "right to exclude strand" when it is not essential to the economic value of the property); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) (finding that the right to exclude was
significant enough to require compensation); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)
(holding that loss of future profits when there is no physical property restriction is an
insufficient "strand" to constitute a taking).
27. 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
28. Yee, 503 U.S. at 524.
29. Id. at 525.
30. Id. at 527 (emphasis in original).
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2. Regulatory Takings
Despite the clear per se rule of physical takings, Supreme
Court jurisprudence in regulatory takings is marked by a number of
different tests. In addition to a per se rule in regulatory taking
cases, the Court has espoused numerous characterizations of regulatory takings standards. This section will first articulate the per se
rule for regulatory takings and will subsequently discuss other
standards the court has announced.
A regulatory taking automatically occurs when a regulation
"denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land."'" A
regulatory taking is also a per se violation of the takings clause.
Lucas v. South .Carolina Coastal Council2 is a quintessential example of when a regulation fits the per se rule. In Lucas, the
plaintiff bought two parcels of land intending to build single family
homes similar to residences built on adjacent lots.33 After the
plaintiff purchased the lots, the state legislature enacted the
Beachfront Management Act. This Act barred the landowner from
building any habitable structure.34 The lower courts determined
that the plaintiff had lost all economically viable use of the land.35
As a result, the Supreme Court created a categorical rule requiring
a takings determination, regardless of whether the purpose of the
regulation was to confer a benefit or prevent a harm.36 When depriving the landowner of all economically viable use, the government may escape a takings claim if the interest the owner asserts
was never originally a part of the owner's title.37

31. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
32. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
33. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
34. Id. at 2889-90.
35. ld. at 2890.
36. Id. at 2998-99. Until Lucas, many courts applied a "harm-benefit theory" to regulatory takings. Under this theory, a land use regulation would be upheld if it prevents a
harm to private landowners; however, courts would invalidate regulations that only confer
a public benefit. MANDELKER, supra note 18, at 24. The Court in Lucas rejected the
harm-benefit analysis, stating that "the distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefitconferring' regulations is often in the eye of the beholder. . . Whether one or the other
of the competing characterizations will come to one's lips in a particular case depends
primarily upon one's evaluation of the worth of competing uses of real estate." Lucas,
112 S. Ct. at 2897-98.
For a comprehensive interpretation and modification of the harm-benefit theory, see
Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE LJ. 149 (1971).
37. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. The Court stated that background principles of state
nuisance law would help courts determine whether a property right existed prior to the
takings claim. Id. at 2900.
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Even without a complete deprivation of economically viable
use, however, courts analyze regulations and decide if they unconstitutionally take a landowner's property.38 One early articulation
of a test to determine whether a regulation is overreaching was in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.39 Penn Central
owned the Grand Central Station Terminal in New York City and
wanted to build a high-rise office building above the Terminal.'
The city had previously designated the Terminal a historic landmark and prohibited the plaintiffs from building.4 The Court
found that a taking had not occurred based on a balancing of three
factors: (1) the character of the government action, (2) the extent
the regulation interferes with "distinct investment-backed expectations," 42and (3) the economic impact of the regulation on the landowner.

Notwithstanding the above three factor test, the Court espoused an alternative analysis in Agins v. City of Tiburon.43 In
Agins, the Court refused to find a taking when the city limited the
number of residential dwellings a developer could construct on five
acres of undeveloped land. 44 The Court explicated a two-part test
to determine regulatory takings: (1) whether the regulation substantially advances a legitimate state interest or (2) whether the regulation denies the owner of all economically viable use of the proper-

38. Early in takings jurisprudence, the Fifth Amendment was thought to only apply to
physical appropriations. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (holding that
a statute that banned the production of alcohol did not amount to a taking of a beer
manufacturer's property, despite the near worthlessness of the land). However, this view
was later rejected when the Supreme Court stated that "[tihe general rule at least is, that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
39. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
40. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115-16.
41. Id. at 115, 117.
42. Id. at 124. The balancing of these three factors was part of the Court's "ad hoc,
factual inquir[y]." Id. Justice Brennan explained that the character of a government action
was more likely to result in a taking if there was a physical invasion, rather than if the
action merely adjusted the "benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good." Id. Justice Brennan's discussion of investment backed expectations was brief, but
he stated that plaintiffs could not prevail merely by showing that they were denied an
opportunity to exploit a property interest that they previously believed was available. Id.
at 130. Finally, the Court noted that governments were allowed to have some economic
impact on a landowner. "government may execute laws or programs that adversely affect
recognized economic values." Id. at 124.
43. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
44. Agins, 447 U.S. at 257, 259.
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ty.'t The existence of these two alternative tests makes it clear
that there is a substantial gray area between the two per se
rules."
B. Development of Exaction Cases
Government use of development exactions is not a recent
phenomenon. In the early part of the century, subdividers were not
required to make any physical improvements on property they
developed.47 As a result, subdividers created many more land plots
than were needed and some were never completely developed. In
response to this problem of overdevelopment, local governments
levied "special assessments" on individual lot owners in order to
finance subdivision improvements." This proved unworkable during the Depression because many individuals defaulted on their
special assessment payments. As a result, special assessment bond
holders suffered losses and the bonds became unmarketable.49
These problems resulted in more stringent land regulations and
subdividers were required to install necessary improvements at their
own expense."0
Exactions became more popular as local governments realized
they could require subdividers to dedicate streets and similar improvements in return for the privilege of recording their plats. 5'
Although some argued that such exactions violated the takings
clause, the exactions became accepted over time as being "proper
' Fees in lieu
conditions on the exercise of the regulatory power."52
of dedications also became popular and they, along with dedications and exactions, were expansively imposed on rezoning applications, variances, conditional use permits, and even building per-

45. Id at 260.
46. In other words, the cases that fall between the two per se rules have no clear
takings test governing them. Most cases fall between per se physical takings and regulatory talings which deny the landowner all economically viable use of the land.
47. DONALD G. HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND DEVELOPMENT 903 (2d ed. 1980). An "improvement" is "[a] valuable addition made to property (usually real estate) .. . intended to enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt
it for new or further purposes." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 757 (6th ed. 1990).
48. HAGMAN, supra note 47, at 903. A "special assessment" is "[a] tax, intended to
offset cost of local improvements such as sewer, water, and streets, which is selectively
imposed upon beneficiaries." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 116.
49. HAGMAN, supra note 47, at 903.
50. Id.
51. Id.at 904.
52. Id.
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mits.53

When the police power is used as a justification, however, a
nexus is usually required between the regulation and the regulated
property.54 The Court tried to clarify this relationship in preceding
exaction cases and addresses it once again in Dolan.
1. The Unanswered Question: Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission" is a development
exaction case similar to Dolan. It established the first prong of the
test used in Dolan. The Nollan Court did not go further than the
first prong, however, because it found that the prong was not satisfied. Therefore, the exaction was a taking.
The Nollans sought a permit to tear down their bungalow and
build a three bedroom house.56 The California Coastal Commission conditioned approval of the permit on the Nollans granting an
easement across their beachfront property for the use of the general
public." The Commission reasoned that the view of the beach
would be blocked by a "'wall' of residential structures," presenting
a psychological barrier to people using the full extent of the beach
and burdening the public's ability to traverse along the
shorefront."5
The Court found that the easement requirement was an unconstitutional taking. It held that for a permit condition to avoid a
takings claim, it must (1) substantially advance a legitimate government interest and (2) contain an "essential nexus" between the land
use regulation and the state's land use goals.59 The Court recog-

53. Id. at 905. For example, a development project might be too small to require that
the developer dedicate land to the city. A series of these small development projects,
however, could create a need for more open space or more schools. As a result, the city
may require the developer to contribute a proportional amount of money to cover the
impact of his or her project. Morosoff, supra note 19, at 849.
54. In addition to takings challenges, landowners have also attacked the validity of development exactions under the substantive component of the due process clause. Under
this standard, "the exaction must be reasonably related to some legitimate governmental
purpose and must not unduly oppress the regulated party." Morosoff, supra note 19, at
850.
55. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
56. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
57. Id. The easement covered the portion of their property bounded by the mean high
tide line and the seawall.
58. Id. at 828-29.
59. Id. at 834, 837.
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nized that the state could legitimately use its police power to impose a concession of property rights by a landowner.' However,
it found that the state's goals of preventing a psychological barrier
were not furthered by allowing the public to cross the plaintiff's
property. Therefore, no essential nexus was established. 6 The
Court did not go further to address the amount of connection required between the regulation and the actual impact of the proposed development.62
2. The Court's Answer: Dolan v. City of Tigard
The Supreme Court used Dolan v. City of Tigard to establish
the second prong of the exaction analysis. The plaintiff, Florence
Dolan, wanted to expand her plumbing store but the city of Tigard
would not grant a permit unless she dedicated all property lying
within a 100-year floodplain for the improvement of a storm drainage system. The City also required an additional fifteen feet of
property adjacent to the floodplain as a pathway for pedestrians
and bicycles. 3 Dolan sought a variance, but the Commission denied it after determining that customers and employees of the future site could use the pathway for recreational and transportation
needs." In addition, the Commission asserted that the pathway, as
an alternative means of transportation, might reduce some of the
traffic congestion created by the proposed expansion. It also found
that the increased storm water flow created by the expansion was
reasonably related to the flood plain dedication.65
The Supreme Court stated that even though the Nollan part of
the test was met," there were additional requirements to avoid a
takings claim. In the case of a takings claim that does not deprive
a landowner of all economically viable use, a court must engage in
two inquiries: (1) whether an essential nexus exists between a
legitimate state interest and the permit condition67 and (2) whether

60. Id. at 836.
61. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838-39.
62. The Court in Dolan recognized that the Nollan court did not address this question
because "the connection did not meet even the loosest standard." Dolan v. City of Tigard,
114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994).
63. Id. at 2314.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2315.
66. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
67. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317. This was the prong established by Nollan. Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
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there is a "rough proportionality" or "reasonable relationship" between the interest being asserted and the actual impact of the proposed property use. 8 The Court stated that "[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some effort
to quantify its findings in support of the dedication . . beyond [a]
6
conclusory statement.

, 1

Applying the Nollan prong, the Court found that preventing
flooding and reducing traffic congestion were legitimate interests."
The Court also found an essential nexus between preventing floods
and limiting development in the 100-year floodplain, as well as
reducing traffic congestion and providing an alternative means of
transportation.7
However, the Court stated that the rough proportionality test
was not met. When discussing the floodway easement and the new
building, the Court concluded that there was no rough proportionality because the Community Development Code already required
that Dolan maintain fifteen percent of her property as open space;
the floodplain almost satisfied that requirement. The city, however,
wanted additional property along the creek for its greenway system.72 The Court could not see how a public greenway, as opposed to a private one, better served the interest of flood control.
The Court was concerned that Dolan lost her ability to exclude
others, "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property."73
When addressing the pathway and new building issues, the
Court found that even though the city estimated that the proposed
expansion of the store would create about 435 additional trips per
day, the city found merely that the pathway could offset some of
the congestion, not that it did in fact so offset.74 Apparently, the
Court felt that the city had not adequately quantified its findings to

68. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318-19.
69. Id. at 2322.
70. Id. at 2317-18. The Court previously defined the scope of legitimate interests to
include ordinances and zoning laws that bear a substantial relation to public welfare and
inflict no irreparable injury on the landowner. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
261 (1980).
71. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318. The Court recognized that if Dolan doubled the size of
her store and paved her gravel parking lot, the amount of impervious surface would increase, resulting in more storm water run-off into Fanno Creek. Id.
72. Id. at 2320. The city not only wanted to prevent the plaintiff from building on the
floodplain, it also wanted the property along the nearby creek for its greenway system. Id.
73. Id. at 2320 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
74. Id. at 2321-22.

1995]

HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

justify the impact on the plaintiff's land.75
The question that remains after Dolan is what type of
quantification is necessary to satisfy the rough proportionality test.
It appears that the Court requires an impact assessment on a
landowner's property. If the regulation or exaction pertains to an
environmental concern as in Dolan,76 the courts might require the
use of methodologies and techniques similar to those required in
generating an environmental impact statement under NEPA and its
state counterparts.' The difference is that the Court is doing so in
reverse. Instead of requiring -the government agency to show the
development project's impact in order to obtain its permit, the
Court is requiring local governments to conduct an assessment
justifying their denial of a particular land use or imposition of a
conditional permit.
Next, this Note analyzes the type of assessment courts will require after Dolan. Cases cited with approval by Dolan are one
source of guidance in trying to understand the level of
quantification necessary. Another basis for comparison is the standard of review courts have used when plaintiffs attack the sufficiency of methodologies in environmental impact assessments under
NEPA or the CAA. In addition, this Note will present suggestions
for complying with the new Dolan standard.
III.

ANALYSIS

A. Pre-Dolan Cases
The Court in Dolan cited a number of state cases that it
claims used a rough proportionality standard. Although some cases
referenced did not specify the required quantification, a few cases
focused on the data generated to support their findings." What the
75. Justice Steven stated that the court had "stumbled badly" by shifting the burden of
proof to the government, requiring a demonstration of the amount of impairment a regulation imposes on the plaintiff. Id. at 2330 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens stated that
cities traditionally have had a presumption of constitutionality concerning land use regulations and that the majority's decision resurrected substantive due process analysis. Id. at
2326-27 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
76. Environmental concerns include more than ecological problems. See infra notes
111-15 and accompanying text.
77. For a detailed explanation of environmental impact statements, methodologies, techniques, and environmental legislation, see infra part M.B.
78. One case cited by the Supreme Court that does not give much guidance in the
amount of quantification necessary is Call v. City of West Jordan, where a developer was
required either to dedicate seven percent of a proposed subdivision to the public or to
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cases do indicate is (1) a complete lack of evidence is insufficient
to overcome the government's burden of proof,79 (2) some quantitative showing of past development trends might be adequate,"
and (3) quantification regarding size, economic impact, and amount
of land consumed could be adequate as far as land dedication cases
are concerned."
The problem remains, however, that there is much that the
preceding cases do not indicate. For instance, the cases do not
indicate how much deference governments' findings will be given
when landowners challenge governments' methodologies or techniques. 2 Also, the cases are unclear concerning whether governments must consider alternatives to the projects or mitigate possible
adverse impacts of the projects. 3

donate its equivalent in cash value. Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 218
(Utah 1979). The court found that the dedication had a reasonable relationship to the
needs created by the subdivision, even though the dedication might not solely benefit that
particular subdivision. Id. at 220. No quantification by the city was cited and the case
was resolved on the basis of the city's general police power in land use regulation. See
id. at 219 (citing to the city government's promotion of "health, safety, morals, and
general welfare").
Similarly, in Collis v. City of Bloomington, the city required a 10% dedication of
the proposed project's land or its equivalent in cash to be used for public parks and
playgrounds. Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn. 1976). The landowner argued that using a specific percentage across the board did not establish a reasonable relationship because "there is no showing that the resultant acreage is at all related
to the . . . needs generated by the subdivision." Id. at 27 (quoting Ira M. Heyman &
Thomas K. Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New
Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE LJ. 1119, 1142 (1964)).
Since different size subdivisions bring different amounts of people to the city, a developer
might be forced to pay a disproportionate share of the park and recreation needs she or
he creates. Id. The court resolved the issue by focusing on the fact that the 10% figure
could be rebutted by the developer and was subject to judicial review. Id. The court did
not focus on any quantitative data presented by the city and therefore provides little guidance in this respect.
79. Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980).
80. See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447-48 (Wis. 1965)
(justifying land dedication requirements of subdividers on a showing by the municipality
that it was those subdividers, who had brought the people into the community, that made
the dedication necessary). It is unclear, however, if such a showing is sufficient under
Dolan if the quantification does not reflect the plaintiff's actual project. See infra notes
91-100 and accompanying text
81. City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984).
82. Will governments be judged by an "arbitrary and capricious" standard or a "hard
look" standard similar to that imposed on administrative agencies' environmental impact
assessments in NEPA litigation? Or will they be held to a different standard, either more
or less deferential? See infra part II.B.2.
83. Cf. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988) (requiring the consideration of alternatives and mitigation of adverse impacts). In addition, the
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Simpson v. City of North Platte,84 although not cited in
Dolan, gives some insight to what definitively will not meet a
rough proportionality test. The Simpson court found an insufficient
relationship between the city's comprehensive plan to construct
streets and its requirement that the developer dedicate land to build
a proposed street." The plaintiff landowners had applied for a
building permit to expand their parking lot.86 The permit was refused on the grounds that the developer had not dedicated a forty
foot right-of-way for the extension of an existing street.87 The
court noted that there was no evidence that the city was actually
going to go through with the project, even though the city's comprehensive plan stated that the street in question would be extended.88 The city also did not present evidence of what the project
involved, how the landowner's project would produce additional
traffic sufficient to justify the dedication, or why no other adjacent
landowner would have to dedicate land unless she or he wanted to
develop.89 This case, therefore, supports Dolan's requirement that
"the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in support
of the dedication .. beyond [a] conclusory statement."' The city
provided no hard data to support the dedication requirement; therefore, based upon this lack of evidence, the court found a taking
had occurred.
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls9 illustrates a court's
analysis when past development trends are used for decisional
support. In Jordan, a city required the dedication of land for
school, park, and recreation needs. 92 The court upheld the city's
ordinance as constitutional. 3 To support their conclusion, the

courts give no indication whether the government can or should impose the burden of
quantifying the impact on developers before deciding whether to approve a particular
project. Although the following cases provide some insight, additional guidance is necessary for government entities to have adequate information about complying with the new
test prong.
84. 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980).
85. Simpson, 292 N.W.2d at 301.
86. Id. at 299.
87. Id. at 299-300.
88. Id. at 301. The city acquired no real estate for the expansion of the street and
gave no indication when any real estate might be acquired. Id.
89. Id90. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2322.
91. 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965).
92. Jordan, 137 N.W.2d at 445.
93. See id.at 450 (finding a reasonable relationship between the zoning ordinance and
the city's police power).
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court relied on evidence introduced by the city.94 The city presented a planning expert who testified that in order to have a good
environment for human habitation, municipalities need a minimum
of 3000 square feet for park and school purposes.95 The city also
provided statistics that showed the urban impact of the city's proximity to Milwaukee, resulting in (1) forty-one new plats with 628
lots being approved between 1959 and 1963,96 (2) an increase in
school population between 1958 and 1963,7 and (3) an increase
in village population from 6262 in 1950 to 25,000 in 1964.18 The
court concluded that this statistical showing was sufficient to justify
the dedication requirement."
This case gives some insight into the type of affirmative evidence necessary to support governmental regulations. This case,
however, would not meet Dolan's requirements on its face. The
city only illustrated past increases in the city's growth from other
sources; it did not quantify findings which applied to the particular
developer at bar.
For instance, the city did not predict that Jordan would bring
in X number of residents and increase the school population by Y,
so that Z square feet would be required to maintain an appropriate
amount of school and park land. Viewed in this way, Jordan is not
very helpful to states or municipalities, since Dolan seems to demand data which applies to the particular plaintiff bringing the
action."e
The court in City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp.'
gives some indication of what a court might consider sufficient
evidence to establish the requisite reasonable relationship or rough
proportionality."a The court found that, as a facial challenge, the
94. The court reasoned that the required dedication could be upheld as a valid exercise
of police power if the increase in population from the development required the city to
provide more land for schools, parks, and playgrounds. Id. at 448.
95. Id. at 446.
96. Id. at 448. As a result of this expansion, five developers dedicated land. Four of
the dedications were used for parks and one was used for a public school. The village
also bought additional park locations. ld.
97. Id. at 448.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 448-49.
100. The Court in Dolan recognized that a "general agreement exists among the courts
'that the dedication should have some reasonable relationship to the needs created by the
[development]."' Dolan, 114 S.Ct. at 2319 (quoting Call v. City of West Jordan, 606
P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979)) (emphasis added).
101. 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984).
102. College Station, 680 S.W.2d at 805.
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city's ordinance mandating that a developer dedicate land for city
park purposes was constitutional." 3 The court noted that the ordinance only affects a developer if he or she chooses to develop;
"the ordinance does not permit the city to initiate action that compels the dedication of park land."'1' 4 The court remanded the case,
however, to see if there was an applied taking. Specifically, the
court wanted to know whether there was a reasonable connection
between increased population from development and increased park
and recreation needs."° The court requested evidence of "the size
of the lots in a subdivision, the economic impact on the subdivision, and the amount of open land consumed by the development."' This case appears to most closely comport with the
Dolan standard because it is asking for quantification that applies
to the specific landowner in the litigation. However, it is narrow in
scope and only marginally useful for .future cases.
The cases relied on by the Court in Dolan provide only limited assistance in determining what level of quantification is necessary to survive a takings challenge. The next step is to analyze
other areas in which governments are required to support their
decision-making through quantification.

[l]n order for (an] ordinance to be a valid exercise of the city's
police power.. . there are two related requirements. First, the regulation must
be adopted to accomplish a legitimate goal; it must be "substantially related" to
the health, safety, or general welfare of the people. Second, the regulation must
be reasonable; it cannot be arbitrary.
Id. (citations omitted).
103. lit at 806. The Supreme Court has made a distinction between "facial" and "applied" takings challenges. A plaintiff brings a facial challenge when the mere enactment
of the statute in question constitutes a taking of property. Stephanie E. Marshall, Comment, Refining the Constitutional Limits on Governmental Regulation of Private Property,
30 WLLAMETrr L. REV. 817, 823 (1994). The Court has held that the test in a facial
challenge is whether the statute denies the plaintiff of all economically viable uses of his
or her land; "[plaintiffs] thus face an uphill battle in making a facial attack." Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987). A plaintiff brings an
applied challenge when the application of the statute to a specific piece of property resuits in an unconstitutional taking. Marshall, supra at 823.
104. College Station, 680 S.W.2d at 806.
105. ld. Unlike the later opinion in Dolan, the court stated that the burden rested on
the plaintiff to establish that there was no reasonable connection. Id. at 806-07.
106. Id. at 806.
107. Id. at 807.
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Comparison with TraditionalEnvironmental Assessments

Since Dolan appears to require an environmental impact assessment, examining the area of law that pioneered environmental
impact assessments is useful. Predicting the impact that a proposal
will have on a discrete group or area is a task with which government entities are familiar. In 1970, Congress enacted NEPA. °5
The legislation was created to force the federal government to
consider the environmental impact before beginning a proposed
project."° To accomplish this, every federal agency must prepare
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for any major action
which could have a significant impact on the environment."' Although the term "environment" is not defined by NEPA, section
102 of the Act indicates that the term includes physical,"' soand aesthetic" 4 dimensions."'
cial," 2 cultural, economic,"'
108. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988).
109. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989) ("Preparation of [EIS's] . . . is at times necessary to satisfy [NEPA's] 'action forcing' purpose.").
110. "Environmental Impact Statement" is the term NEPA uses. However, scientists
often refer to these statements as "environmental impact assessments." The most complete
definition of an "environmental impact assessment" is the "process for identifying the
likely consequences for the biogeophysical environment and for man's health and welfare
of implementing particular activities and for conveying this information, at a stage when it
can materially affect their decision, to those responsible for sanctioning the proposals."
Peter Wathern, An Introductory Guide to EIA, in ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 6 (Peter Wathem ed., 1988). In simpler terms, it means ensuring
the decision makers understand the consequences of their actions. Id.
An "impact" is defined as the "change in an environmental parameter, over a
specified period and within a defined area, resulting from a particular activity compared
with the situation which would have occurred had the activity not been initiated." Id. at
7.
111. This includes both the natural and constructed physical environment. For example,
not only do the land, climate, vegetation, and wildlife make up the physical environment,
but so do surrounding land uses (single family homes versus industrial areas) and public
services (water supply, sewage, etc.). John G. Rau, Concepts of Environmental Impact
Analysis, in ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ANALYSIS HANDBOOK 1-24 to 1-25 (John G. Rau &
David C. Wooton eds., 1980).
112. For example, this would include community facilities such as schools and parks or
socioeconomic and racial characteristics of the community. Id. at 1-25.
113. This would include unemployment levels and the economic base of the area. Id.
114. This would include historic sites or scenic areas. Id.
115. Section 102 states that the federal government must,
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will ensure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts
in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures . . . which will insure that
presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appro-
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Section 102(2)(C)(i) of NEPA describes what an EIS should in-

clude. It also mandates that all federal agencies must,
(C) include in every recommendation or report on

proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man's environment and maintenance and enhancement
of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible or irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented.116
Since NEPA only applies to projects by the federal government, it was soon followed by numerous state schemes known as
"little NEPAs..... 7 Often the state environmental policy acts
(SEPA's) place harsher requirements on the agencies doing an EIS
than does the federal standard." 8
priate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations.
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988) (emphasis added).
116. Id. For more specific requirements, see Council on Environmental Quality, 40
C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517 (1994).
Many critics of NEPA worried that the EIS was not taken seriously by the federal
agencies and that the EIS was merely something the agency would add on after they
decided to do a project. Some commentators now argue, however, that the EIS requirement has contributed greatly to reducing adverse impacts before an agency reaches the
"authorization phase." Rau, supra note 111, at 6.
117. For comprehensive treatment of the state versions of NEPA, see FRANK P. GRAD,
2 TREATSE ON ENViRONMENTAL LAW § 9.08, at 9-315 (1994).
118. See California Environmental Quality Act, CAL, PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177
(West 1986 & Supp. 1995) (requiring that long-term protection of the environment be the
"guiding criterion" in public decisions); Hawaii Environmental Quality Law, HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 341-44 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (requiring any factors above and beyond NEPA
that the director may by rule prescribe); MD. CODE ANN. NAT. RES. §§ 1-301 to 1-305
(1989) (making a healthful environment a "fundamental and inalienable right"); Minnesota
Environmental Protection Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116.01-116.99 (West 1987 & Supp.
1995) (requiring additional duties such as encouraging education, reducing solid wastes,
avoiding unnecessary resource depletion, and minimizing noise); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 75-1-101 to 75-20-1205 (1994) (entitling its citizens to a healthful environment); N.Y.
ENvTL. CONsERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1995) (modeling
act after California's Environmental Quality Act); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21C.010
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EISs typically measure two types of environmental effects,
primary and secondary impacts. Primary impacts are environmental
effects that can be directly traced to the proposed action."9 For
example, a primary impact of a dam is its prevention of the upward movement of migratory fish.2 Possible secondary impacts
are "indirect or induced changes [which] typically include the associated investments and changed patterns of social and economic
activities likely to be stimulated or induced by the proposed action.'' Secondary impacts of the dam are lower fish population,
altered stream flow, turbulence, and increased oxygen tension.
Ultimately, the survival of the species in the river would be affect-

ed. 12

There are many different ways to measure the primary and
secondary impacts of a project. Since many of the EISs address
complicated technical and scientific issues, a number of techniques
and methodologies have been developed to enable agencies to
accurately assess the environmental, economic, or sociological
impact on any given area. Readers should distinguish between
"techniques" and "methodologies" used in EISs. Techniques are
scientific measurements used to predict specific impacts on the
environment: for example, determining noise levels or the amount
of traffic flow." Methodologies, on the other hand, collate, arrange, present, and sometimes interpret data according to organizational principles. 24
Even though these techniques and methodologies are generally
reliable, methodologies in particular have been challenged by disgruntled landowners on the basis of inadequate scientific support or
improper application to a. particular area."z Plaintiffs have
to 43.21C.910 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995) (making a healthful environment a "fundamental and inalienable right").
119. Rau, supra note 111, at 1-26.
120. Wathem, supra note 110, at 8.
121. Rau, supra note 111, at 1-26.
122. Wathern, supra note 110, at 8.
123. R. Bisset & P. Tomlinson, Development in EIA Methods, in ENVIRONMENTAL IM-

PACr AssESsMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 47 (Peter Wathem ed. 1988).
124. Id. Because some projects require many different types of measurement, more than
one methodology may be necessary. Id. For example, a methodology that could measure
and communicate the impacts on plant and wildlife may not be the best methodology to
communicate the social and economic impacts of the same project.
125. Wathem, supra note 110, at 4. Soon after NEPA was enacted, environmental
groups used the court system to force federal administrative agencies to do ElSs. As a
result, an abundance of literature surfaced addressing the techniques and methodologies
that could be used in preparing an EIS. Id. Since there is no relevant litigation concern-
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challenged methodologies under both NEPA and the CAA. 1
If state and local governments use similar NEPA and CAA
techniques and methodologies to meet the quantification required in
Dolan, plaintiffs could challenge the technique or methodology.
Plaintiffs could argue that the requisite proportionality is not met.
Although only a small amount of litigation over the adequacy of
the methodologies has occurred, there are cases in which courts
have held a methodology inadequate. 27 Some of the methodologies implemented are the checklist, matrix, network, overlay, and
modeling methods."
1. Common Methodologies
Many of the methodologies commonly used in impact assessments could be very helpful to governments when they try to
quantify their decision-making rationales. The methodologies contain many inherent weaknesses, however, which could subject them
to challenge by plaintiffs seeking just compensation. Perhaps the
most common method used in impact assessments is the checklist
method.'29 The checklist method consists of a two-way chart that
lists "impact areas" that may be affected by a project. 3 ' The alternatives of "adverse effect," "no effect," and "beneficial effect"
are listed on the horizontal axis and conditions and factors that
may be affected by the project are on the vertical axis.' The
data is then classified as either "beneficial," "adverse," or "no
effect."'3 An advantage of this method to governments trying to
prove the requisite rough proportionality is that it presents a broad
assortment of considerations in a simple format. Because it is
so simple, it is easy for the courts and landowners to understand.
This makes it harder for potential plaintiffs to fight against obvious
impacts of their property when trying to disprove the rough pro-

ing techniques and the techniques significantly vary, they will not be discussed in the
following sections.
126. When challenging a methodology under NEPA, plaintiffs use § 102(2)(C)(i). Aside
from NEPA, plaintiffs have also challenged the sufficiency of methodologies used by the
EPA in trying to promulgate emissions standards as required by § 110 of the CAA. See
infra notes 160-64.
127. See infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
128. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LmGATION 10-4 (2d ed. 1992).
129. Id. at 10-6.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 10-7. For an illustration of the checklist method, see id. at 10-8.
133. MANDELKER, supra note 128, at 10-6 to 10-7.
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portionality.
There are disadvantages to governments using this method. It is
considered a qualitative analysis, not quantitative. 3 4 Plaintiffs
could argue that the checklist method is in violation of Dolan's
mandate that the government's findings be quantified.'35 By classifying environmental impacts as either beneficial or adverse, without any supporting scientific quantification, plaintiffs could argue
that the government is doing as poor a job as the city of Tigard
did in Dolan when it said that the bicycle pathway "could" offset
some of the traffic. 36 In addition, this method has been criticized
because it must be very exhaustive to ensure that no serious impact
is overlooked.' 37 Landowner plaintiffs could use this criticism to
argue that the method does not truly reflect the actual impact of
their proposed property use.
Another methodology used in impact assessments is the matrix
method. Like the checklist method, the matrix method uses a twoway comparison. 31 It places project components on a horizontal
axis and conditions or factors to be analyzed on the vertical axis. 139 The analyst chooses two numbers between one and ten: one
number indicates the magnitude of the impact and the other indicates its importance." 4 This method could be useful to governments because it can reveal that particular impacts result from the
interaction between the proposed development and the environment. 4' In this way, the government can claim that it has met

134. Id. at 10-7. Qualitative analysis differs from quantitative analysis because it is more
descriptive than comparative; it does not place a number judgment on an impact. For
example, the checklist method uses the terms "beneficial" and "adverse" to describe an
impact, whereas a quantified analysis would rank the adverseness of an impact on a numerical scale, such as from one to 10. See id.
135. The Dolan court stated that "the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication . . . beyond [a] conclusory statement. . . ." Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2322 (1994).
136. Id. For an argument that qualitative standards are just as useful as quantitative
standards in analyzing takings cases, see Robert J. Blackwell, Comment, Overlay Zoning,
Performance Standards, and Environmental Protection After Nollan, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. Rev. 615 (1989).
137. Wathem, supra note 110, at 11.
138. MANDELKER, supra note 128, at 10-9.
139. Id.
140. Id. For an illustration of the matrix method, see id. at 10-11.
141. Wathem, supra note 110, at 13.
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the rough proportionality standard of Dolan.42
On the other hand, critics have accused this method of being
very subjective and easy to manipulate. 43 Another weakness is
that neither the uncertainty nor the variability of impacts are accurately reflected.'" Plaintiffs can argue that this weakness fails to
meet Dolan's rough proportionality standard because the impacts of

plaintiffs' project are uncertain. Commentators have also criticized
matrices for producing biased assessments or double counting of
impacts in the event that an inadequate list of factors is selected
and analyzed. 45 Plaintiffs can use this to their advantage, asserting that the government inadequately quantified its findings under
Dolan.
A third methodology commonly used in impact assessments is
the network method. This method expands on the matrix method,
analyzing in terms of cause, condition, and effect.'" The network
method is usually shown in tree form and is generally best suited
for single project assessments. 47 The main advantage of this
methodology is that it identifies cumulative and indirect effects;'4
therefore, potential plaintiffs will have a weaker argument that the
requisite rough proportionality is not present. A disadvantage, however, is that this method is characterized as a qualitative summary
and, like the checklist method, plaintiffs could argue that it does
not satisfy the quantitative mandate of Dolan.49 It also requires a

142. In other words, the government has established a rough proportionality between the
legislative interest asserted and the actual impact of the plaintiff's proposed property use.
Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
143. MAiDELKER, supra note 128, at 10-9. Commentators have argued that "subjectivity .. . is hidden within a spurious objectivity" because the impacts assessed are chosen
by a small group of decision makers or experts. Bisset & Tomlinson, supra note 123, at
53. They can manipulate the assessment form to measure what impacts they consider important and hide those that do not achieve their desired goals. Id.
144. MANDELKER, supra note 128, at 10-9. "The matrix cannot indicate uncertainty
resulting from inadequate data or an inappropriate rating system. 'Similarly, there is no
way of indicating environmental variability, including the possibility of extremes that
would present unacceptable hazards if they did occur, nor are the associated probabilities
indicated."' Id. at 10-9 to 10-10. (quoting ENViRONmETAL IMPACr AssEssMNT. PRiNcIPLES AND PtocEmums 42 (Munn ed., 1979)).
145. MAMnELKER, supra note 128, at 10-9.
146. Id. at 10-12.
147. ld. This method is best suited for single projects because it only identifies potential
impacts and not the conditions that characterize the project location, making the display
too extensive for a larger region. Id. For an illustration of the network method, see id. at
10-14.
148. ld.
149. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
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considerable amount of data that may be too complex to be useful,

does not distinguish impacts of low probability but high potential
damage, 150 and does not link environmental consequences to envi-

ronmental conditions.' 5' This gives potential plaintiffs ample room
to challenge the methodology by maintaining that the existence of
a rough proportionality cannot be proven.
A fourth method used for impact assessments is overlays. This
method is especially useful for large regional projects. Originally,
decision makers used a map that showed each factor's impact on a
transparency. All of the transparencies were overlaid to show the
total impact. 52 Today, many agencies use a computerized approach called the Geographical Information System (GIS). 53 This
approach to overlaying is much faster, easier, and less expensive. 54 Overlaying is good for satisfying the Dolan test because
it provides a quantitative analysis.
It synthesizes the data and
55
shows spatial relationships well.
However, some problems confront governments using overlays.
The method depends heavily on cartographic skill for its accuracy
and effectiveness. 56 Also, when using a computer program, the
possibility of technical error always exists.'57 Both of these criticisms give plaintiffs latitude to challenge the effectiveness of the
government's quantification.

150. In other words, the methodology does not differentiate among environmental impacts that have a low chance of occurring, but that would be devastating if they did,
from impacts that have a high chance of occurring, but would only have a minor impact.
151. MANDELKER, supra note 128, at 10-12 to 10-13.
152. Id. at 10-15. For an illustration of how overlays work, consider a project where
the decision maker analyzes ecological sites, historic sites, noise impacts, and visual impacts to decide whether the project should be implemented. The decision maker produces
four transparencies of the area. Those sections affected by each of the four factors are
colored, and the transparencies are overlaid to show the composite impact on the area.
See Wathem, supra note 110, at 15 (providing a diagram of overlays).
153. MANDELKER, supra note 128, at 10-16. The GIS system uses computer programming to do the same aggregation process as overlay transparencies and searches for areas
with the fewest environmental limitations. Id.
154. Id. In addition, using transparency overlays limits the number of impacts a decision
maker can consider to approximately 10. In the computerized analysis, the factors considered are quantitatively scored to a reference grid. They can then be weighted as to significance when they are aggregated, giving the computerized method much more flexibility.
J.B. Shopley & R.F. Fuggle, A Comprehensive Review of Current Environmental Impact
Assessment Methods and Techniques, 18 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 25, 41 (1984).
155. MANDELKER, supra note 128, at 10-16.
156. Shopley & Fuggle, supra note 154, at 41. Cartography is the "art or work of making maps or charts." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, 218 (2d College ed. 1986).
157. Wathem, supra note 110, at 15.
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A final method commonly used in impact assessments is the
modeling method. This method utilizes a simplified version "of the
complex systems that exist in the real world" to show impacts.158
Modeling is commonly used since other methods produce too much
documentation when there is a large amount of environmental data
to consider.'59 The process of creating a model can be time consuming and expensive, and analysts often draw upon existing models while altering the parameters and changing, the assumptions.'"
Models appear on their face to be an excellent way to comply with
Dolan, since they rely on mathematical, quantitative analysis. Research shows, however, that models are frequently attacked for
being scientifically out of date or for not being applicable to the
project at hand. 6' These past challenges, discussed in more detail
below, make models fair game for challenge by landowner plaintiffs.
In sum, analyzing the inherent strengths and weaknesses of
methodologies presently used in environmental assessments is useful to governments trying to comply with Dolan's quantification
standard. Governments should find these methodologies helpful,
while recognizing that there are many pegs upon which a landowner can hang his or her litigation hat.
2.

Judicial Review

Governments' familiarity with the methodologies commonly
used in environmental impact assessments is only somewhat helpful
in determining whether they can overcome a Dolan-type claim.
EISs under NEPA have been subject to long and protracted litigation as plaintiffs repeatedly challenge the sufficiency of the EIS.
Similarly, regarding the CAA," the EPA has come under attack
for the methods they have used to measure the ambient air quality
impacts'63 of proposed projects under the CAA. This section will
examine judicial review under both NEPA and the CAA. Next, it
will analogize NEPA and CAA judicial review to how courts might

158. MANDELKER, supra note 128, at 10-16 to 10-17.
159. Id.
160. Shopley & Fuggle, supra note 154, at 42.
161. See infra notes 165-69.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1988).
163. Ambient standards "specify the permissible concentrations of air pollutants in the
atmosphere...
Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the
Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. REv. 713, 723 n.50 (1977).
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approach takings cases.
a.

NEPA & CAA

Generally, courts apply little substantive review under NEPA
and are deferential to agency decisions concerning the methodology
used to prepare EISs. As long as the agencies make a good faith
effort to quantify their findings and the data presented through the
methodology is not misleading, courts will uphold the methodologies used."6 Courts take a similar stance when plaintiffs challenge modeling methodologies under the CAA. Courts have upheld
the EPA's decisions when it has (1) used an invalidated model;"~
(2) made decisions based on modeling alone, without monitoring; 6 (3) made decisions based on modeling and monitoring
even though there was a conflict with other modeling results; 67
and (4) relied on a model even though an alternative model was
available." Although courts could possibly give governments less
deference under takings claims, they are likely to continue afford-

164. See, e.g., Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989);
Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1519 (9th Cir. 1992); Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
873 (1989); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 469 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974); Residents v. Dole, 583 F. Supp. 653, 664 (D. Minn. 1984);
Davison v. Department of Defense, 560 F. Supp. 1019, 1025 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Brown v.
EPA, 460 F. Supp. 248, 250 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 435 F.
Supp. 775, 782 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Movement Against Destruction v. Trainor, 400 F. Supp.
533, 541 (D. Md. 1975).
165. See, e.g., Northern Plains Resource* Council v. EPA, 645 F.2d 1349, 1362-63 (9th
Cir. 1981); Mision Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123, 129 (1st Cir. 1976).
166. See, e.g., Hawaiian Elec. Co. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1984); Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Costle, 715 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1983); Northern Plains
Resource Council, 645 F.2d at 1362-63; Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co. v. Costle, 638
F.2d 910, 912 (6th Cir. 1980); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 14, 19
(6th Cir. 1980); Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797, 805 (6th Cir. 1980);
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA 572 F.2d 1150, 1164 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 910 (1978).
167. See, e.g., Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 13 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1461, 1465 (7th Cir. 1979); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660, 664 (6th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
168. See, e.g., California ex rel. Air Resources Bd. v. EPA, 774 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th
Cir. 1985); Hawaiian Elec., 723 F.2d at 1446; New York v. EPA, 716 F.2d 440, 444
(7th Cir. 1983); New York v. EPA, 710 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (6th Cir. 1983); Connecticut
Fund for Env't, Inc. v. EPA, 696 F.2d 169, 178 (2nd Cir. 1982); Connecticut v. EPA,
696 F.2d 147, 159 (2nd Cir. 1982); United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283,
292-93 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980) (stating that the results of
alternative models were compatible with EPA's conclusion); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating
Co., 572 F.2d at 1161.
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ing governments substantial deference." 9
When NEPA was enacted in 1969, the legislature did not
indicate a standard of review; therefore, it was up to the courts to
fashion a standard.17 For a period of time, the cases distinguished between two different duties of compliance. The courts
imposed a procedural duty on agencies to comply with all of the
section 102(C) requirements. Courts review the procedural requirements under a "rule of reason" standard, concentrating on whether
the public and decision makers can make an informed decision
from the EIS.' Courts had also imposed a substantive duty on
agencies to reject or modify actions that have negative impacts on
the environment." n Although the Supreme Court has since decided that NEPA only imposes a procedural duty on government
agencies," courts' brief analyses of the adequacy of EISs under
a substantive standard of review is enlightening.
The argument that an EIS under NEPA could be reviewed for
its substance originated in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe." A private citizen group was trying to prevent the Secretary of Transportation from using federal funds to construct a six
lane highway through a public park. 75 The Court analyzed see-

169. See infra part lI.B.2.b.
170. MANDELKER, supra note 128, at 10-17.
171. The court in Sierra Club v. Corps of Engineers provides an good explanation of
this procedural standard:

mhe EIS must set forth sufficient information for the general public to make
an informed evaluation, and for the decisionmaker to 'consider fully the environmental factors involved and to make a reasoned decision after balancing the
risks of harm to the environment against the benefits to be derived from the
proposed action.'
Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1029 (2d Cir. 1983)
(citations omitted) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368,
1375 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978)).
172. MANDELKER, supra note 128, at 10-18.
173. The court in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council stated,
Although [the] procedures [of NEPA] are almost certain to affect the agency's
substantive decision, it is now well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate
particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process. If the adverse
environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values
outweigh the environmental costs.
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (citation omit-

ted).
174. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
175. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 406. Under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, the
Secretary was not permitted to authorize federal funds to finance construction of highways
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tion 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to determine
the correct standard of review. 76 It decided that the agency's decision could only be set aside if it was "arbitrary, capricious, and
an abuse of discretion."'
Courts in subsequent cases interpreted Overton Park to require
administrative agencies to take a "hard look" at the adequacy of
their impact assessments.7 7 As a result, courts would sometimes

through parks if "feasible and prudent" alternatives existed. Even if there are no alternatives, the Secretary can only approve the construction if all possible mitigation efforts
have been made. Id. at 405.
176. Section 706 of the APA addresses the scope of judicial review of administrative
agency decisions:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and
557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record
or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the
rule of prejudicial error.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
177. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 414. The Court refused to conduct a de novo review
under the APA because this form of review was limited to when the action is "adjudicatory in nature and the agency factfinding procedures are inadequate . . . [and] when issues that were not before the agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce
nonadjudicatory action." Id. at 415. The Court also refused to apply the "substantial evidence" standard because it determined that the standard only applied if the action was
through a rulemaking proceeding or was based on an adjudicatory hearing. Id. at 414.
178. MANDELKER, supra note 128, at 10-20. The term "hard look" was first used in
this context by Judge Leventhal in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. See
Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 509, 511 (1974) (encouraging higher scrutiny of science-based cases). The hard
look doctrine requires that agencies "develop an evidentiary record reflecting the factual
and analytical basis for their decisions, . . . explain in considerable detail their reasoning,
and . . . give 'adequate consideration' to the evidence and analysis submitted by private
parties." STEPHEN G. BREYER & RIcHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REG-

1995]

HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

scrutinize the scientific support agencies gave for their decisions.
Although the amount of litigation over particular methodologies is
small, the cases provide some insight on how courts might treat
similar challenges under Dolan.
No cases challenge the sufficiency of checklist or network
methodologies,'79 however, matrix and overlay methodologies
have been challenged under NEPA. The leading case challenging
the matrix methodology is Minnesota Public Interest Research
Group v. Butz.' Environmental groups challenged the Forest
Service's permission to cut timber in specified forest regions,
charging that the Service's EIS under NEPA was inadequate. The
Forest Service used the matrix methodology to calculate the impacts of various management activities and uses on the forest.'8 '
The District Court agreed with the plaintiffs, concluding that the
methodology "does not represent an accessible means for opening
up the decision-making process and subjecting it to critical evaluation outside the agency."' 82
Reversing the decision of the District Court, the Court of Appeals focused on the Forest Service's use of the study in good
to mislead anyone." '84 The
faith.' "We discern no intent ...
court noted that the EIS was not dispositive of the impacts and
that it was impossible to predict the exact effects of any activiMost importantly, the court pointed out that it was not
ty.'
within judicial discretion to decide what methodology a government
agency should use in quantifying the impacts of a project.'86
This case not only shows the court's unwillingness to overrule
a government's choice of methodology," s it also illustrates the
ULATORY PoLICY 363 (3d ed. 1992).
179. For a discussion of possible challenges to these methodologies, see supra notes
129-37, 146-51 and accompanying text.
180. 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977).
181. Butz, 541 F.2d at 1301. The activities analyzed included "soils, water level management, minerals, vegetation management, wildfire, wildlife habitat, recreation activities,
recreation facilities, land occupancy, historical and archeological uses, and travel network
and entry points." Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1302.
184. Id.
185. Id.
anticipate that courts were to . . . determine the merits of
186. "[NEPA] did not .
conflicting views between the two or more schools of scientific thought and to thereafter
disapprove any final EIS which may rely upon data which was inconsistent with the
court's finding." Butz, 541 F.2d at 1302 (alteration in original) (quoting EDF, Inc. v.
Froehlke, 368 F. Supp. 231, 240 (W.D. Mo. 1973), affd, 497 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1974)).
187. See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 822 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that
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judicial deference given to the government's expert. Some courts,
however, have been more willing to find a government's methodology inadequate. In City of Romulus v. County of Wayne,' the
court held that an overlay methodology used to predict the noise
impact of a proposed runway was inadequate. The court found that
the decibel threshold chosen by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was "highly misleading and did not conform to current
scientific knowledge about the effect of noise on humans."'89 The
plaintiffs presented expert testimony, accepted by the court, that the
threshold chosen was a dangerous magnitude. The court also
agreed that the FAA should have considered noise levels above and
below the decibel level chosen.'O
The court then added a caveat to its decision. It stated that the
criticisms about the validity of the methodology went beyond a
mere difference of opinion between scientists; the court was not
attacking the underlying concepts of the overlay methodology.'
Its primary concern was that the threshold decibel level chosen by
the FAA was misleading to readers of the EIS." The concerns
expressed by the court in Romulus fit into the general view that
the primary goal of NEPA is to provide the public and decision
maker with adequate information upon which to base an informed
decision. 93 As a result, the court was not really concerned with
the methodological challenge.
Outside the context of NEPA, many challenges brought by
plaintiffs attack the EPA's use of mathematical models to determine proper emissions standards for a particular region. 4 Like
NEPA, the method of judicial review under the CAA is the "arbi-

the use of a matrix for analyzing the impact of oil spills was permissible as a good faith
effort at quantification and because it was no more arbitrary than plaintiffs' choice of
methodology).
188. 392 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Mich. 1975), vacated as moot, 634 F.2d 347 (6th Cir.
1980).
189. Romulus, 392 F. Supp. at 592.
190. Id. at 592-93.
191. Id. at 594.
192. Id.
193. Council on Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1994) ("NEPA procedures must insure that environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made and before actions are taken.").
194. The CAA requires that the EPA promulgate uniform federal ambient air quality
standards. The statute requires the EPA to create standards for major pollutants and forces
the states to devise implementation plans to ensure that the federal standards are attained.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7410.
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trary and capricious" test of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).9 s Although courts have found model methodologies inadequate under the CAA, they generally will uphold the decisions of
the EPA.
A leading case that found an EPA decision inadequate when
based on a modeling methodology is Texas v. EPA.' The state
of Texas challenged the roll-back model used by the EPA to attain
federal ambient air quality standards for the control of photochemical oxidant pollution (smog)."w The state asserted that its model
for reaching air emissions standards was more sophisticated than
the EPA's and that the court should substitute it for the roll-back
model.'98 Even though the court recognized the deficiencies of the
roll-back model, it upheld the model's use because the EPA only
had crude information to apply to a "wide-ranging government action..'.. The court did not mandate a greater level of reliability,
but it did impose on the EPA a responsibility to develop and update its methods as the technology became available."o
The court concluded that particular portions of the EPA's plan
were inadequate because it used incorrect data, assumptions, and
adjustment factors while using the model.2t" The court held that
the EPA's failure to address these objections made the EPA's
decision arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, even though the court
upheld the use of the methodology, it rejected the data the EPA
used. The court did not find the methodology itself inadequate.
Other courts have looked closely at the methodology used by
the EPA while promulgating standards.' In general, however,
195. Section 307(d)(9)(A) of the CAA calls for application of the APA's arbitrary and
capricious test under § 706(2)(A). See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A).
196. 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 905 (1976).
197. Id. at 293.
198. Id. at 298.
199. Id. at 301. The court affirmed the EPA's rejection of Texas's model since it was

novel, unsupported by data, and lacked meaningful explanation. It also had not been subjected to public scrutiny and comment like the EPA model. Id.
200. Id. at 301 n.16.
201. Id. at 308-09. The state's primary objection to the data was the reactivity factor
applied to a hydrocarbon inventory for the petroleum refining reactive inventory. The EPA
chose the lower of two possible factors based on data from Los Angeles and Louisiana.
The state argued that 1) the Los Angeles study was outdated, 2) the Texas refineries had
a product mix different from the west coast, and 3) special characteristics of the Texas
refinery emissions made the chosen factor inconsistent with those characteristics. Id. at
308-09.
202. See Ohio v. EPA, 798 F.2d 880, 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the model the
EPA used to set emission limits for electric utility plants was arbitrary and capricious
because its reliability had not been adequately tested, monitored, or validated); PPG
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courts are very deferential to the agency's choice as long as there
is scientific support for the agency's conclusions.'
b.

Application to Takings Cases

Although courts appear to show a substantial amount of deference to administrative agencies under both NEPA and the CAA,
there is reason to believe there will be less government deference
under the takings clause. Possible reasons for diminished deference
include, (1) the allocation of the burden of proof, (2) the remedy
in each of the different actions, and (3) the difference between
constitutional and statutory bases of authority. However, courts are
very reluctant to get involved in judicial review of complex, scientific data. Their primary concern is that governments are not abusing their police power to avoid paying compensation. As a result,
courts are likely to defer to governments if they make a good faith
attempt to quantify their decision-making.
Arguments that courts will diminish their traditional deference
in takings cases are as follows. First, it is not clear whether courts
are deferential to government agencies in NEPA and CAA cases.
Rather, they could be concluding that the plaintiff did not meet the
burden of proof.2" If so, courts may more likely rule against the
government in Dolan-type cases, because the Court in Dolan shifted the burden of proving a rough proportionality from the plaintiff
to the government." 5
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council supports the argument that courts might focus on the party with the burden of

Indus., Inc. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 462, 467-68 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that EPA failed to
develop an adequate administrative record when it based its decision on modeling, rather
than conflicting monitoring results); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660,
663-65 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979) (finding use of dispersion
coefficient arbitrary and capricious where agency ignored results of two privately financed
studies and the conclusions of an experts' conference). Like Texas v. EPA, none of these
cases found that the methodology could ever be adequate. In each, the agency only failed
to adequately support its decision in light of other evidence.
203. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
204. In NEPA and the CAA, the burden is on the plaintiff rather than the agency. See
Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 818 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that the burden of
proof is on plaintiffs in NEPA actions); Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 357
(3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) (putting burden of proof on plaintiffs
in enforcement proceeding under the CAA).
205. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (stating that the city in Dolan failed to
meet its burden of justifying the impact of the proposed land use).
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proof, rather than automatically deferring to the government.' In
Marsh, the Court upheld the Army Corps of Engineers' decision,
based on a modeling methodology, not to prepare a supplemental
environmental impact statement (SEIS) for a dam construction
project.' Plaintiffs sought to enjoin construction of the dam because of two documents developed after the Corps released its EIS
and Final Environmental Impact Statement Supplement (FEISS).S
In the proceeding below, the Court of Appeals used these documents to require that the Corps complete another SEIS.2 9
The Corps used computer simulation models to study the impact that the dam would have on water quality, fish production,
and angling.2"' They determined that increases in temperature and
turbidity caused by the dam might occasionally impair fishing, but
decided to approve the project anyway.2 ' The Corps concluded
that the benefits of the project outweighed the costs and that the
project was in the best interest of the public.212
The plaintiffs argued that a second SEIS was necessary because
two documents were not adequately considered by the Corps. First,
an internal memorandum (the "Cramer Memorandum") prepared by
two biologists for the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife
(ODFW) stated that the dam would adversely affect downstream
fishing. The Cramer Memorandum was based on a draft ODFW
study.2 '3 The court of appeals found several assertions in the
Cramer Memorandum compelling.214 Second, a soil survey conducted by the United States Soil Conservation Service (SCS) suggested that there could be greater downstream turbidity than the
FEISS indicated.
Reversing the decision of the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court attacked both the plaintiffs' methodology and their failure to
quantify findings specific to the dam project. The Court first attacked the assertions of the Cramer Memorandum by pointing out
206. 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
207. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 361.
208. Id. at 364-65, 368-69.
209. Id. at 369-70.
210. Id. at 365. The river on which the dam was to be placed was one of the Nation's
best fishing areas; therefore, the Corps paid special attention to the impacts on fish population and fishing. Id.
211. Id. at 365-67 & nn.5-8.
212. Id. at 367.
213. Id. at 369, 378-84.
214. The court of appeals also focused on an epizootic disease that could cause high
fish mortality. Id. at 380.
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that the report did not state the extent of the possible population
reduction or the amount of warming to be expected." ' "Instead,
the memorandum estimated that an increase of only one degree
centigrade in river temperature in ' January would decrease survival
of spring Chinook 'from 60-80%. 1216
This criticism sounds remarkably similar to the Court's criticism of the city of Tigard in Dolan. It seems that the Marsh court
is criticizing the ODFW memorandum for not establishing a rough
proportionality between the need to do another SEIS and the actual
impact of the dam on the spring chinook. Similarly, the Court in
Dolan found no rough proportionality between the additional traffic
created by Florence Dolan's hardware store expansion and the need
for a bikepath.2 7 Therefore, it is possible that courts will focus
on the party with the burden of proof when analyzing the sufficiency of support for a given project, and not automatically grant
deference to the government.
The Marsh Court also cited the Corps' criticisms of the
plaintiff's methodology as another reason to disregard the
Memorandum's concern. 28 This lends further support that courts
will focus on the party with the burden of proof. "[B]ecause the
model employed by ODFW had not been validated, its predictive
capability was uncertain. Indeed, ODFW scientists subsequently
recalculated the likely ... increase in temperature, adjusting its
estimate of a 60-to-80 percent loss downward to between 30 and
40 percent., 219 This is similar to when the Court criticized the
city of Tigard for not adequately quantifying its traffic information.
The second reason courts might be less deferential in takings
cases is that the stakes are much higher than under NEPA or the
CAA. As discussed in Romulus, the primary goal of NEPA is to
provide the public and decision maker with adequate information
upon which to base a decision.22 If an EIS is found to be inadequate, the EIS is simply redone. The same situation occurs where
the EPA has inadequately used modeling methodologies to set
emission standards. Under these two statutes, the agencies have a
second chance to make things right.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
Id. at 380 (quoting the Cramer Memorandum 3a).
Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321-22.
Marsh, 490 U.S. at 381.
Id.
See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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Under a takings challenge, the goal is more than informed
decision making and the stakes are higher than requiring a new
EIS or emission standard. The remedy for a successful takings
claim is either damages for the property taken or rescission of the
offending ordinance. " This makes it more important for courts to
ensure that the correct substantive decision is reached. Sloppy work
by a government body could waste taxpayer money through repeated takings challenges and the generation of faulty data.' This
will give courts incentive to analyze takings cases more closely.
The third reason courts may review takings cases carefully is
because they encompass a constitutional right rather than a statutory right. The provisions of NEPA and the CAA have no constitutional basis tm They are entirely creatures of the legislature. Property rights, however, enjoy a more favorable and protected status.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has elevated the status of property rights
through Dolan to an equal level with fundamental rights such as
voting and free speech.' 4 Courts, therefore, are more likely to
require governments to adequately support their reasoning with
hard data.
Although the discussion above is somewhat compelling, reality
dictates that courts will still be substantially deferential in takings
cases. First, most courts express a strong reluctance to question
scientific analysis. There has been a longstanding debate about the
amount of deference courts should give to substantive review of
scientific decisions. Some commentators feel that courts should
apply a "hard look" doctrine to scientific decisions. Judge
Levanthal, a leading advocate of this view, asserts that courts
should "foray into the technical world to the extent necessary to
ascertain if the [government's] decision is reasoned. While we must
bow to the acknowledged expertise of the administrator in matters
technical we should not automatically succumb thereto, overwhelmed as it were by the utter 'scientificity' of the expedition. '"m

221.

MANDELKER, supra note 18, at 21.
222. On the other hand, however, the court could scrutinize too strictly and be too apt
to strike down the government's actions. Plaintiffs would have incentive to challenge the
government, thus increasing litigation.
223. Stewart, supra note 163, at 714 ("Advocacy of a constitutional right to environmental quality by scholars and litigants has been rejected by the courts.").
224. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 (1994).
225. Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied sub nom. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
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Others feel that procedural safeguards under environmental
legislation are sufficient to ensure nonarbitrary decisions concerning
scientific issues. Judge Bazelon states,
[T]he best way for courts to guard against unreasonable or
erroneous administrative decisions is not for the judges
themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of each decision. Rather, it is to establish a decision-making process
that assures a reasoned decision that can be held up to the
scrutiny of the scientific community and the public. 6
As review of the NEPA and CAA cases indicate, most courts
appear to be in line with Judge Bazelon and accord more deference
when scientific decision-making is at issue. 7
Second, the Supreme Court has expressed a deep concern that
governments are using their police power to avoid payment when
acquiring property or accomplishing community goals. In Nollan,
the Court criticized as "an out-and-out plan of extortion" the requirement that plaintiffs grant a beachfront easement in order to
build on their lot.22 Similarly, the Court made it clear in Loretto
that "a landlord's ability to rent his property may not be conditioned on his forfeiting the right to compensation for a physical
occupation."" If courts follow the approach taken in NEPA and
CAA cases, they will uphold the government's methodology choice
if it makes a good faith effort to quantify and the data presented is
not misleading. This would mitigate the Court's concern that governments are trying to coerce landowners into giving up their land
without being compensated.
From these two countervailing considerations, courts are likely
to give at least as much deference in takings cases as they do in
administrative regulatory challenges. However, the chance exists
that some courts may closely scrutinize methodological challenges
under the takings clause. Therefore, a question remains as to how
governments can adequately comply with Dolan. The following
section supplies recommendations for complying with Dolan in the

226. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, J., concurring).
227. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
228. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (citing J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 1415 (N.H. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Town of Auburn v. McEvoy, 553 A.2d
317 (N.H. 1988)).
229. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439 n.17.
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case of lower court deference.
IV.

SUGGESTIONS FOR COMPLYING WITH DOLAN

Although Dolan purports to be an attempt by the Supreme
Court to clarify the takings doctrine, placing the burden on government to prove adequate quantification creates new shades of gray.
Perhaps Dolan is an attempt by the Supreme Court to reign in
what they might consider overzealous state and local regulation. As
discussed above, the Court has expressed concern that governments
are using land regulations as an inexpensive way to acquire property. The Court may have thought it was time to raise the status of
property rights in the Constitution generally. Regardless of the
Court's reasons for the Dolan test, it may tip the balance just as
far towards property owners as some perceive it was previously
tipped towards governments' discretion to regulate.
One investigation has shown that fear of being required to pay
just compensation poses a serious obstacle to environmental regulation. Several officials of state administrative agencies stated that
they found state and federal takings jurisprudence too vague to
provide any meaningful guidance."0 As a result, officials saw the
possibility of having to pay just compensation as a significant
barrier to regulation. z ' At the time of the investigation, state officials thought Nollan increased regulations' chilling effect by expanding protection of private property rights. 2 Overall, the regulators thought that the takings clause encouraged litigation and
stifled incentives to enact environmental regulation. 3
State officials are likely to have the same reaction to Dolan,
since the case seems to magnify their former fears of expanded
private property rights protection and increased litigation. Chief
Justice Rehnquist explicitly expanded property rights protection by

230. Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs:A Study in Political Influence and
Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 829 (1990). Ms. Butler conducted
interviews with 26 officials from state environmental agencies and 10 local government

officials. Additionally, interviews and meetings were held with various special interest
groups. Id. at 827 n.16.
231. Id. at 829.
232. Id. at 830.
233. Id. Local government officials seem especially concerned about the impact of takings cases and expanding property rights. One official stated that "lawmakers who foresaw
an increased risk of litigation would be more likely to weaken the regulatory programs
that they adopted by, for example, including broad grandfather clauses; yet the weaker the
program, the less effective it becomes.' Id. at 831.
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raising its status beyond that of a "poor relation." 4 Commentators have also predicted that placing the burden on the government
to quantify their findings will increase litigation as landowners
challenge the sufficiency of the governments' methodologies. 5 If
state and local governments reduce regulation, landowners will
have more latitude to make decisions concerning environmental
protection. Faced with a choice between protecting environmental
concerns and their own financial welfare, landowners are likely to
place the environment on the back burner. Therefore, to keep an
adequate balance between governments' temptation to overregulate
and landowners' temptation to ignore environmental concerns, state
and local governments need clarification on how they can comply
with Dolan and still carry out their regulatory functions.
Two commentators have suggested methods to avoid the rubric
of Dolan. First, they suggest land use regulations be made generally applicable, rather than site specific. The commentators note
that the Court made such a distinction in Dolan:
[I]n evaluating most generally applicable zoning regulations,
the burden properly rests on the party challenging the regulation to prove that it constitutes an arbitrary regulation of
property rights ... . Here, in contrast, the city made an
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application
for a building permit on an individual parcel. In this situation, the burden properly rests on the city. 7
Second, they suggest using restrictions rather than dedications
because courts are more sensitive to actual transfers of property
than they are to restrictions on the use of property. 8 Third, the
authors suggest alternative financing methods, such as a general tax
or a special financing district. 9 Under these circumstances, the
government could avoid showing a rough proportionality. Finally,
234. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 (1994).
235. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
236. Kass & Gerrard, supra note 13, at 35.
237. Id. (quoting Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320 n.8).
238. Id.
239. Id. But see N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27:1C-2 (West 1995). New Jersey currently
has a statute that establishes special financing districts. The districts are created in areas
where there has been explosive growth and a subsequent increased burden on the state's
transportation system. The district imposes special fees on developers who wish to build
in these areas, so long as the fee is "reasonably related . . .to the added burden attributable to that development." Id. It appears, therefore, that the Dolan standard could creep
into legislation for special financing districts as well.
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they assert that quantifying the extent developers benefit economically from the restriction will prevent a landowner from asserting
that he or she has suffered a loss in property value." °
All but the last of these suggestions help governments avoid
situations in which a Dolan-type claim might arise by avoiding
land use exactions altogether. This is not helpful, however, to
governments that already have a regulatory system in place that is
likely to be challenged. The following is a proposal to address this
issue.
This Note proposes that state and local governments address
Dolan from two different standpoints: substantive and procedural.
From a substantive standpoint, governments should use the quantitative methodologies and techniques employed by administrative
agencies under statutes like NEPA and the CAA. These methodologies and techniques have been tested, validated, and subjected to
challenge. As a general rule, governments have successfully used
them to quantify their decision-making. As discussed above, courts
have tend to be deferential to administrative agencies' methodology
choices. Courts could be less deferential to legislative enactments
by governments in takings cases because governments have the
burden of proof, the stakes are higher, and takings cases address a
constitutional right. However, if state and local governments make
a good faith effort to quantify their decisions, courts are likely to
accord them some deference.24' This substantive approach, however, is only the first step toward generating the rough proportionality
required by Dolan.
Governments should also implement procedural safeguards to
ensure that rough proportionality is achieved and also to dissuade
landowners from challenging their quantification. This Note suggests making two levels of quantitative findings. On the first level,
state and local governments should make broad, quantitative findings to support the regulatory system in general.242 They could do
240. Kass & Gerrard, supra note 13, at 35. For example, a parcel of land is more
valuable with a road built on it than without one. However, the majority in Dolan refused
to take this factor into account. Id. Justice Stevens in his dissent was very disturbed that
the majority did not consider the benefit conferred on the landowner by the permit condition, noting that state courts take such considerations into account. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at
2324 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
242. At least one commentator has suggested that an environmental assessment should
be done at each level of planning in the NEPA process. He asserts that this is necessary
to judge the impacts on the surrounding area and that land planners must collect as much
information as possible at every stage. Robert H. Twiss, Linking the EIS to the Planning
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this either before the regulations are enacted or after enactment if
the regulatory structure already exists.
The second level of quantification would occur when developers seek to have their projects approved under the regulatory structure. The government could approach this stage in one of two
ways. First, it could make independent findings as to whether the
landowner's proposed project would fit within the goals of the
regulatory system. In this event, the government should impose
conditions on or deny the project only if the methodology or technique used to quantify the impact of the project could support such
conditions or denial. Alternatively, the government could generate a
detailed questionnaire that would require the landowner to quantify
the impact of the project on the area. The government could use
the results generated from its first level of quantified findings to
pinpoint exactly which impacts should be addressed.
There are advantages and disadvantages to either approach to
the second level of quantification. If the government chooses to
evaluate the landowner's proposal itself, the advantage is that the
government can ensure that biases of the landowner have not
skewed the results of the quantification in favor of approving the
project.243 The government would already be familiar with problems that might arise from the project because of its first level of
quantification. The disadvantage is that the government has to incur
additional costs. Some states may be unwilling to hire additional
employees to evaluate each proposed project, once completing the
first level of quantification. Other states, however, are likely to
conclude that the benefits of avoiding suits under the takings

Process, in ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT ASSESSMENT:

GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY

13

(Thomas G. Dickert & Katherine R. Domeny eds., 1974).
Mr. Twiss identifies three levels of planning, referred to as "mission-oriented planning," and argues that land planners must study the impacts at each level to address different questions. Id. at 9-10. The lowest level of planning is the functional level. At this
level are projects implemented in a similar type of area. One example Twiss uses is the
Army Corps of Engineers protecting a particular area of coastline. Id. at 8. The second
level of planning is program planning. In this case, the planning involves particular sets
of technologies related to the type of location. Floodplain zoning and brush conversion are
examples of this type of planning. Id. Finally, the highest level of planning is the policyonly plans; these have eivironmental implications, but no direct relation to any particular
environment. Id. at 9. Twiss cites the increased amount of permissible tree-cutting in
national forests to provide cheaper housing as an illustration. Id.
243. See Wathern, supra note 110, at 17 (arguing that landowners in preparing an environmental assessment are inherently biased and will only present results that lead to authorization).
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clause outweigh the additional labor costs."
Even if some states desire unbiased data, there is an advantage
-to having the landowner prepare a site specific impact assessment:
lower cost. States could reduce costs by avoiding future lawsuits
and by escaping additional labor costs. The landowner has significantly more information about the characteristics of the project and
can therefore assess the impact of the project more efficiently.245
As mentioned before, however, the disadvantage is that the landowner may skew the results in his or her favor to get the project
authorized.
In complying with the second level of quantification, the goal
of state and local governments is to have accurate data at low cost.
Therefore, they would presumably prefer having the landowner
substantially contribute to the second level of quantification using
accurate and unbiased information. Governments would want to
provide landowners with incentives to produce such information.
To combat the tendency towards biased assessments, state and
local government could involve other citizens likely to be affected
by the proposals. 2' Public input is a common feature in the
administrative decisionmaking process.24 A panel of interested
members of the public could provide a check on developers. This
panel could be set up on a voluntary basis so the government
would not incur added expense. 2" At the same time, developers
should be included in the process. They will then have less incentive to challenge a regulatory decision, since they were instrumental
in its creation. Also, courts will be less concerned about govern-

244. However, this benefit applies regardless of whether the government or the landowner does the second level of quantification.
245. Id. (asserting that having landowners prepare the assessment ensures that the assessment is "fully integrated into project formulation, as is almost universally advocated").
246. States already appoint members of the public to zoning and planning boards. See,
e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-4-902 (Bums 1994) (appointing five citizens members to
their advisory board of zoning appeals).
247. The Council on Environmental Quality requires that a federal agency completing an
EIS under NEPA request comments from the public and "affirmatively" solicit comments
from interested or affected people or organizations. Council on Environmental Quality, 40
C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(4) (1994). Likewise, administrative agencies are required under § 553
of the APA to receive public input when engaging in formal rulemaking. 5 U.S.C.A. §
553 (1995); see also Clarice E. Gaylord & Geraldine W. Twitty, Protecting Endangered
Communities, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 771 (1994) (discussing the importance of considering the public interest in disputes between governments and landowners).
248. Wathem also has suggested a review panel of independent technical experts.
Wathern, supra note 110, at 17. However, it is unlikely this could be done on a voluntary basis.
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ments forcing landowners to exchange property rights for permission to develop because the landowners themselves had the opportunity to participate in the second level of quantification before
their project is approved.
In sum, governments should use methodologies and techniques
employed in other environmental assessments, bifurcate the assessments on a general and site specific level, and allow input from
the public and developers. In this way, governments are likely to
meet Dolan's burden of establishing a rough proportionality between their regulatory decisions and the impact of the proposed
development. Although courts may give state and local governments less deference because of the unique circumstances of takings cases, their scrutiny should not be so harsh that governments
are afraid to pass or enforce environmental regulations.
V.

CONCLUSION

Implementation of the Fifth Amendment takings clause involves
a delicate balancing so that government can work for the good of
its citizenry without trampling upon the rights of individuals. There
must be a compromise between the need to preserve the environment and the need to preserve property owners' rights. The Supreme Court's effort to clarify its takings doctrine in Dolan v. City
of Tigard has the potential to be a step toward achieving the necessary balance. It should not, however, be used as a springboard
by landowners to overrun government efforts to prevent environmental degradation. There is no constitutional right to a reasonably
clean environment. This author, however, hopes that it will remain
an enjoyable privilege.
KIM I. STOLLAR

